# A.28 Somalia – 2011 – Famine / Conflict

# **Update:**

**Keywords:** Urban neighbourhoods, Household NFIs, Construction materials, Transitional shelter, Site planning, Infrastructure, Coordination.

#### **Project timeline** Country: Somalia **Project location:** Mogadishu 14 months - Construction phase Conflict / disaster: July 2011 Famine and 12 months - Mapping of Zona K Continuing conflict 11 months - Dedicated Tri-Number of people displaced: Cluster Coordinator 200,000 IDPs in Mogadishu arrives 10 months -Selection of 16 Project target population: projects to be Approximately 36,000 implemented by 14 **Project outputs:** agencies 3,645 housing units complete 8 months -Strategy formed and WASH and health facilities dedicated coordina-Occupancy rate on handover: tor agreed 100 per cent - November 2012 7 months -First funds allocated Shelter size: Non-food items and 15.8m<sup>2</sup> (3.6m x 4.4m) shelter kits distribu-Materials cost per household: tion US\$ 420 July 2011 Famine declared Somalia Early 2011 Displaced people start to arrive Mogadishu

# **Project description**

The Tri-Cluster project is a coordinated group of 16 projects implemented by 14 partners across the sectors of shelter, WASH and health. Zona K in Magadishu was chosen as the target area as it had the densest concentration of IDPs and was the least likely IDP settlement to be evicted once Mogadishu stabilised and developed. The project goal was to improve the protection for displaced people living in Zona K through improved settlement planning and the provision of integrated services from multiple sectors.

# Strengths and weaknesses

- ✓ Regular coordination meetings achieved a common understanding of aims and objectives amongst all partners.
- ✓ By integrating services the project was able to act more efficiently to provide shelter, access to water and sanitation and basic health serives.
- ✓ Settlement planning has enabled organisations to have better access and the beneficiaries have an enhanced sense of community. Displaced people were involved in the development of context-specific planning standards which helped manage expectations.
- **x** Underestimation of the impact of other projects funded through other sources active in the same project area.
- \* Although eviction is unlikely in the short-term, there is no clear ownership of land and so displaced people are vulnerable to the Somali 'gatekeepers'.
- \* A weak community structure combined with the

fact that many people were already settled within the settlement meant that it was not always possible to follow site plans and meet minimum standards.

- **★** Communal spaces have been eroded by an increase in the numbers of people living in Zona K.
- As the sectors work at different levels (shelter with households, WASH with groups of five families per latrine and health with the whole community) synchronising activities required complex work plans.
- Mapping all the stakeholders in the process was difficult, and their influence changed over time.
- The project had a high profile, putting implementing partners under pressure to produce results quickly, compromising planning and construction quality.
- The Tri-Cluster coordinator took on many of the camp management and camp coordindation duties.



# **Before the displacement**

Mogadishu has hosted displaced people from conflicts since 1991. However, as drought worsened in late 2010 and famine approached in early 2011, more and more Somalis were driven away from rural areas to Mogadishu looking for assistance and safety.

Displacement was compounded by the ongoing conflict in Somalia.

### After the displacement

Upon arrival in Mogadishu, the Internally Displaced Persons (IDPs) settled on any unoccupied land. This process of self-settlement meant that there was no site planning. Services such as water and sanitation, and access to the 100 or so settlements were sporadic. As the number of sites closer to the centre of town reduced and as Al-Shabaab's influence lessened, many IDPs settled into the area which became known as Zona K.

Zona K's mixed ownership, between the government, the university and some private individuals, meant that it was one of the least likely sites to be evicted. By the end of 2012, the site covered an area of over 3km<sup>2</sup> with an estimated

70,000 IDPs living in make-shift shelters called *buuls* (traditional Somali thatched shelter). These were constructed by the IDPs themselves from scavenged materials and items received from humanitarian organisations.

Any attempt to coordinate settlements in Mogadishu would have directly interfered with the economic relationship between the host population and the IDPs. As a result, no formal camp coordination mechanism was established.

As a response to the influx of IDPs into Mogadishu, a three-phase strategy was developed in July 2011:

- Provide all displaced people with a non-food item packages
- Provide transitional shelter solutions
- Provide site planning to improve living conditions and access to other basic services such as WASH and health.

The shelter coordination did not advocate the creation of new settlements for the IDPs. This strategy was attempted in Puntland (see A.8 in *Shelter Projects 2008*) but was not very successful. Instead, the

Cluster advocated that organisations should provide humanitarian assistance to the locations where IDPs had self-settled. This has been the approach in Somaliland and Puntland where the conditions and access are more favourable.

The mechanics that control the creation of new camps were deemed too complex and unpredictable to encourage new sites.

# **Implementation**

Under the umbrella of the Tri-Cluster there were five shelter projects, with a total value of US\$ 4 million.

The first project focused on mapping the existing settlement, producing settlement plans, and creating access roads and storm drainage.

This mapping was followed by consultations with the beneficiary community and landowners to ensure that people would not be evicted once work was completed.

One organisation chose to work through long-standing partner organisations while the other contracted the work to local construction companies. Where possible the implementing organisations followed the site plans, but they were often forced to deviate from them. Reasons for this included the need to accommodate new demands from stakeholders, the construction of new permanent structures that had been built after the initial mapping, and the need to accommodate a larger population.

Once the shelters were completed, two local organisations provided non-food items, including blankets, kitchen sets, jerrycans and fuel-efficient stoves. Beneficiary lists were provided by the main shelter partners, and distributions were undertaken once the shelters were handed over.

# Selection of beneficiaries

The whole area was sub-divided into 25 zones, and settlement planning was based on the displaced population at the time of mapping. The two main organisations started in different zones and completed all the construction before moving on to the next. Every IDP that was registered received a shelter and non-food item kits. The other Tri-Cluster partners provided sanitation and water points in the locations identified during the planning process.

# Coordination

Effective coordination was crucial for success, as there were 16 projects operating in a very concentrated area. In addition, there were many actors who were already working in Zona K. Therefore, a dedicated Tri-Cluster coordinator was brought in to act as a focal point for the 16 projects.

Initially there was reluctance from some of the implementing partners to work under the same umbrella. The WASH and health partners did not want to wait for the mapping process to be completed, and wanted to implement projects immediately, regardless of the output from the planning phase.

Over a series of meetings, the importance of coordinating activities was emphasised and a plan was developed where some activities could be carried out at the same time as the mapping.



Coordination and communication was needed with the local authorities ensured that they were aware of the project and its implications, and that they approved the temporary development plans. As the final shelter solution was semipermanent (5 to 10 year lifespan), the urban planning undertaken as part of the Tri-Cluster, will influence the development of this part of the city. Access roads created now, will be the main roads for years to come.

# **Technical solutions**

The shelter actors worked with the main partners to identify a unified shelter typology. Initially, US\$ 80 shelter kits were planned as the land tenure was not known. Later, a 'hybrid' between plastic sheeting and corrugated galvanised iron (CGI) was adopted during the planning stage. This provided a better quality shelter while also keeping a light footprint. The design was developed further just before the construction phase into a full corrugated iron model, partly due to donors and partly due to protection concerns.

# **Future**

The Tri-Cluster project was expanded for 2013 to include education and protection focused projects. It was planned for an additional shelter agency to join the existing two partners, and 3,000-4,000 more shelters were planned.

Once the framework and common understanding on coordination was created, it became feasible to add additional sectors and projects.

The Tri-Cluster approach came about because the Humanitarian Coordinator considered that shelter, WASH and health were the most pressing needs for the IDPs. At the time there was surprise that other sectors were not also included in a multi-sectorial approach. However, the coordination of just three sectors was difficult enough, and in retrospect the presence of additional partners and targets may have reduced the effectiveness of the entire intervention.

Generally, once an organisation secured funding, the focus was immediately on implementing as quickly as possible in order to meet project targets. To combat this "tunnel vision" amongst organisations, the successful multi-agency approach invested heavily in communication and consultation. This always takes time.

Starting with just 3 sectors enabled a culture of coordination to be ingrained. Only once the coordination was working with a few key partners was it possible to expand to the full array of humanitarian services.

