CONFLICT

SOUTH SUDAN 2017–2018 / CONFLICT / OVERVIEW

South Sudan Civil War, December 2013–onwards

**TOTAL PEOPLE AFFECTED**
- 7.1 million individuals, as of Dec 2018

**TOTAL PEOPLE DISPLACED**
- 4.2 million individuals displaced:
  - 2 million internally displaced
  - 2.2 million refugees in neighbouring countries

**TOTAL SHELTERNeeds**
- 2 million individuals

**TOTAL PEOPLE SUPPORTED**
- Over 1.65 million individuals (352,800 households) reached with NFIs
- 383,366 individuals (over 82,000 households) reached with shelter assistance

SUMMARY OF THE RESPONSE

More than three years from the beginning of the crisis, Shelter and NFI needs remained very high both for newly displaced populations and for those who had been displaced multiple times or were in protracted displacement. While in-kind distribution remained the main response modality, in 2017 and 2018 the Shelter-NFI response started to focus more on cash-based interventions and activities to support return in areas of sufficient stability.

CALENDAR OF SEASONAL EVENTS (SOURCE: HRP 2018)

- **Dry season**
- **Rainy season**
- **Floods recede**

Epidemic meningitis

Diarrhoeal diseases: acute watery diarrhea, dysentery, cholera and typhoid fever

Malaria

CASE STUDIES IN THIS EDITION

This edition includes four case studies related to the South Sudan crisis. Three of them were implemented in Protection of Civilians sites (PoCs), where only a minority of the displaced population resided. However, different needs and conditions required different response modalities. The fourth project was implemented in the context of the South Sudan refugee crisis in Uganda.

A.7, on fuel-efficient stoves in Bentiu;
A.8, on shelter upgrades through vouchers in Wau;
A.9, on site rehabilitation and shelter construction in Malakal;
A.10, on shelter construction for refugees in Uganda.

** DTM, April 2018. This number stabilized at around 200,000 in early 2019.
*** This only includes assistance within South Sudan. Populations in PoCs and collective centres may have been reached more than once. Source: Shelter-NFI Cluster Dashboard, see http://sheltersouthsudan.org/
SHELTER-NFI CLUSTER STRATEGY

The strategic objective of the Shelter-NFI Cluster was to ensure that displaced people, returnees and host communities had inclusive access to appropriate shelter solutions, including essential NFIs. The four objectives of the Cluster strategy in 2018 were:

1. Provide life-saving shelter and life-sustaining NFIs to the most vulnerable, newly displaced people;
2. Provide sustainable shelter and essential NFIs to the most vulnerable, protracted IDPs in PoCs, formal camps and collective centres;
3. Strengthen community coping mechanisms and cohesion of vulnerable and at-risk displaced communities;
4. Promote community participation in programme implementation and accountability to inform analysis and future response.

The Cluster also promoted the proactive engagement of other clusters, especially CCCM and WASH, to improve efficiency and effectiveness, and avoid duplication.

Given the protracted nature of the crisis, multiple displacements and communities receiving aid several times, the Cluster took strategic steps towards resilience-based approaches since late 2016. Mainly using cash-based interventions (CBI), these approaches targeted areas of stability and capitalized on existing coping mechanisms and environments where more cost-effective and sustainable activities could be implemented. Piloting started in 2017, and Cluster budget requirements for CBI increased significantly in 2018 and 2019 (USD 4.3 million and USD 4.6 million respectively).

SHELTER-NFI RESPONSE

The response during 2017 and 2018 continued to adopt a dual approach, with static interventions (the majority) and mobile teams (based in Juba) that could deploy to the field to scale up a response or increase access in hard-to-reach areas.

Activities were implemented in diverse settings:

- Return areas with relative stability, where IDPs started to go back after the peace agreement. Returns started to increase in 2018;
- Areas where active conflict was ongoing, which saw large-scale new displacement;
- Locations that became accessible, revealing high levels of needs to attend to;
- PoC sites, where IDPs continued to seek refuge.
IDPs lived in damaged buildings and with host communities.

CBI for shelter upgrade was piloted in 2017 and scaled up in 2018. Interventions involved high community participation.

Mobile teams delivered loose items and kits, including survival kits, to displaced populations outside communal displacement sites.

Distribution teams support people with reduced mobility to transport items home.
In terms of achievements, Cluster partners reached over 939,000 individuals in 2017 (827,000 with NFI and 162,000 with shelter) and over 854,000 in 2018 (810,000 with NFI and 221,000 with shelter).

Between 2017 and 2018, shelter and NFI partners reached nearly 46 per cent new IDPs, 45 per cent protracted IDPs, 6 per cent host community, and 3 per cent returnees. Shelter assistance was mainly targeting people in protracted displacement (over 81%).

Response options included in-kind distribution (of loose items or survival kits), CBI (cash or vouchers, coupled with market and protection risk assessments), and shelter construction assistance in locations where this was the best solution (such as PoCs, collective centres and safe return areas). Additionally, the Cluster and its members focused on transportation to return sites, Housing, Land and Property support, coordination, advocacy and capacity-building activities. The table on the previous page shows the diversity of response options based on phase of the response and settlement typology.

Given the successful results of piloted CBI projects in 2017, the Cluster introduced CBI as a modality of response in the 2018 Humanitarian Response Plan. However, the majority of the interventions remained in-kind distributions of NFIs and emergency shelter items. Out of the total individuals assisted by Cluster partners in 2018, just over 103,000 individuals (12%) benefited from CBI in five locations.

In 2018, the Cluster also piloted a new tool on Accountability to Affected Populations (AAP).

**PRIORITIES FOR 2019**

In 2019, the overall priorities for the humanitarian response in South Sudan included responding to food insecurity, linking to durable solutions, adopting a gender-sensitive approach and mainstreaming protection across interventions. Agencies aimed to continue operating with a combination of static and mobile response approaches, expanding modalities and prioritizing CBI where possible. Increased community participation, involvement of local stakeholders and integrated multisectoral approaches were going to be prioritized.

In line with such priorities, the Shelter-NFI Cluster aimed to strengthen communities’ self-reliance, increase assistance towards returnees, mainstream protection, and expand the AAP approach and CBI and market-based modalities, as well as skills transfer process. To gradually reduce financial requirements of partners, the Cluster promoted shelter rehabilitation trough vouchers and unrestricted cash. To support return, the Cluster also started discussions to develop a multipurpose return package for IDPs moving out of displacement sites.

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2. South Sudan HRP 2019.
4. South Sudan HRP 2018.
5. South Sudan HRP 2018 and 2019.

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The majority of shelter assistance was provided in locations of protracted displacement, such as the PoC in Wau.

IDPs in PoCs had limited livelihood opportunities. Programmes often aimed to address this by providing income and transferring skills.

Through market-based approaches, local traders were engaged to provide materials needed for shelter upgrades.
**SOUTH SUDAN 2017–2018 / CONFLICT**

**KEYWORDS:** Fuel-efficient stoves, Vouchers, Women’s empowerment, Private sector, Cost-effectiveness

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<td>Over 265,000 individuals in PoC sites**</td>
<td></td>
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<td>TOTAL PEOPLE WITH SHELTER NEEDS*</td>
<td>1,673,044 individuals in 2018</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PROJECT LOCATION</td>
<td>Bentiu Protection of Civilians site, Unity state</td>
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<tr>
<td>PROJECT BENEFICIARIES</td>
<td>22,360 households (100,620 individuals)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4 local traders engaged</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PROJECT OUTPUTS</td>
<td>11,180 fuel-efficient stoves built</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1,280 participants of skills training</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>USD 76,120 injected into the local economy</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>OUTCOME INDICATORS</td>
<td>98% usage rate of the new stove; 99% satisfaction rate; 1% of women go out to collect firewood daily (7% before the project); 0% of beneficiaries classify cooking-related fire risks as “high”; 99% state that the stove produces less smoke</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MATERIALS COST</td>
<td>USD 6.7 per household (USD 5.2 cash for work, USD 1.5 stove materials)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PROJECT COST</td>
<td>USD 11.6 per household</td>
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</table>

* South Sudan Humanitarian Response Plan 2018; ** DTM, April 2018.

**PROJECT SUMMARY**

The project enabled the construction of fuel-efficient stoves in a camp through a voucher system. Beneficiaries (almost entirely women) used the vouchers to access stove construction materials procured by local traders and were responsible for constructing the stove. The organization provided cash-for-work grants upon successful completion of a fully functional stove, as well as skills trainings. Significant cost savings were achieved by procuring locally sourced materials from multiple local traders and transferring the supply chain management costs to them, including storage, transport and distribution.

**STRENGTHS**

+ High community involvement and women’s empowerment.
+ The project built on local capacities and the skills-transfer process was organic and self-sufficient.
+ The cash-based approach was cost-effective.
+ Local ownership was promoted.
+ Fewer women had to collect firewood on a frequent basis.
+ Reduced smoke pollution, improving health and well-being.

**WEAKNESSES**

- The project could have taken less time.
- The main construction material was not available on site.
- The project did not include people with special needs.
- Limited collaboration with GBV and Protection actors.

**TIMELINE**

1. Sep 2017: Community engagement plan developed and consortium of small-scale traders established.
3. Nov 2017: Completion of pilot phase, which activated the full roll-out of the FES project.

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The project promoted local ownership by providing women with training to construct fuel-efficient stoves with local materials, which were accessed through a voucher system.
CONTEXT OF BENTIU POC SITE


Almost five years after the beginning of the crisis, the number of internally displaced people (IDP) seeking shelter in the Protection of Civilians site (PoC) in Bentiu was estimated at 113,310 individuals.1 Since December 2013, the site witnessed multiple influxes of new arrivals in connection with spikes in insecurity in surrounding areas. Due to protection concerns, many individuals, particularly men, had not left the site since they arrived over four years before. While some households chose to leave the site, specific threats and generalized insecurity meant that Bentiu remained a life-saving refuge for displaced populations.

COOKING PRACTICES IN SOUTH SUDAN

Due to gender roles, women in South Sudan are mainly responsible for meeting most household needs, including food preparation and fuel collection. Different stoves are used for different size pots, which allow women to prepare a variety of foods for their families to enhance nutrition. Charcoal is the most common source of fuel for these stoves. Women traditionally gather the firewood, while men make the charcoal. In more rural areas or in periods of displacement when no stoves are available, firewood can be the primary fuel source and women cook over polluting and inefficient “three-stone” fires. Women face several challenges in accessing cooking fuel. Firstly, by being forced to venture further and further away from their homes for prolonged periods of time, women are exposed to high risks of gender-based violence (GBV), while men rarely leave the PoC sites for fear of attacks by armed actors. Women also often have inadequate income to support procurement of alternative fuel sources.

IMPORTED STOVES

Households in Bentiu PoC prepared their daily meals on three-stone stoves, in very tight and poorly ventilated quarters, due to the overcrowded conditions of the site. Previous interventions were largely around distribution of technically advanced, fuel-efficient stoves from foreign suppliers. The organization conducted a comparative study of these imported models with locally made stoves. These included both manually produced and industrial products, generally of good quality and durability. However, in the site, imported stoves failed to generate long-term usage among the population, often ending up being sold on the local market, not used at all or left behind, as families move to other locations. This was due to the lack of community buy-in, as these models did not identify and build on solutions that were well adapted to the local context. Additionally, these imported models were relatively costly (from USD 22 to 38) and had high maintenance and repair costs.

PROJECT OBJECTIVE

The project aimed at improving the living conditions in the site through the use of community-made, fuel-efficient stoves, resulting in better fuel collection and meal preparation practices. In line with the Humanitarian Response Plan and Shelter-NFI Cluster strategy, the project focused on increasing the resilience and capacities of the affected populations by using a cash-based modality.

PROJECT IMPLEMENTATION

The project targeted over 11,000 households (almost 90% of the population in the site) and was implemented by a team of three staff. It consisted of four main components: stove design; training of trainers; procurement; and construction through a voucher system. It was preceded by a pilot phase and followed by a verification process that included the disbursement of a cash-for-work grant.

PILOT PHASE. Prior to full roll-out, a pilot phase was implemented to evaluate the feasibility, time, challenges and community buy-in, and to improve the project design. A baseline study, market analysis, stakeholder analysis and evaluation of the pilot phase were also conducted. This provided a background on the population’s challenges and capacity to contribute to the project and confirmed that a cash-based approach was feasible. Hence, a cash-for-work and community engagement plan were developed, cow dung was procured and a consortium of four, local, small-scale traders was established.

STOVE DESIGN AND SELECTION. The organization identified a stove model based on the results of the research study on fuel-efficient stoves and with careful consideration to local cooking practices and community preferences. The stove was built from locally available materials (mud and cow dung) and had a user-friendly design developed by the affected populations themselves. It also reduced firewood consumption and improved users’ health through reducing smoke. A total of seven stoves, including the selected community-made design, together with imported and other local rudimentary stoves, were tested with a minimum of 15 families. The models were rotated manually and followed by a verification process that included the disbursement of a cash-for-work grant.

1 DTM Headcount, March 2018.
to a different family after three days, to ensure that average firewood consumption was not affected by household size or varying cooking techniques. Stoves were tested on insulation, firewood consumption, smoke reduction, local production and material availability. After the tests, focus group discussions on user preferences were conducted and each stove type was scored and ranked. The locally made stove scored highest.

COMMUNITY ENGAGEMENT. All information was communicated through the radio, community leadership, block leaders, door-to-door visits, posters and general meetings. Although the selected stove design was already familiar to the affected population, a community-led communication campaign was undertaken to further highlight the associated health and fuel-efficiency gains. As part of the monitoring and evaluation of the project, a complaints response mechanism was set up at the outset of the project. Information on criteria to qualify for a cash grant after completion of the stove was disseminated through block leaders and construction assistants.

SKILLS TRAINING. The organization trained ten construction assistants in each block within the site, who themselves then trained 1,280 participants (98% women). The training of trainers lasted for one day and participants were compensated with a grant of SSP 150 (USD 1.1) upon successful completion. After this training, the construction assistants were able to provide support, repair or even build the stove. This represented a potential source of livelihood for the future.

PROCUREMENT AND VOUCHER DISTRIBUTION. The construction of the stove required 5kg of mud and 5kg of cow dung. Beneficiaries were responsible for the procurement of mud that could be found near the site. The community leadership selected local traders outside of the site to procure, transport and distribute the cow dung. The delivery of materials to beneficiaries was organized through a voucher scheme consisting of the following steps:

- The organization distributed commodity vouchers to the beneficiaries;
- Traders brought the cow dung to a designated location, just outside of the site;
- Beneficiaries collected one bag of cow dung in exchange for the vouchers;
- Traders redeemed the vouchers with the organization.

CONSTRUCTION. Beneficiaries were responsible for the construction of the stove and the organization incentivized the process by providing each household with a cash-for-work grant worth SSP 700 (USD 5.2) upon completion of a fully functional stove. Once the cow dung was received, they only needed to procure mud by themselves and had three weeks to construct and finalize the stove. After that, the stoves would dry in about two weeks. The construction assistants provided support during the construction process.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>STOVE RANKING TEST RESULTS</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Type</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Wire stove (traditionally used in the PoC)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Iron stove (traditionally used in the PoC)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Metal stove (traditionally used in the PoC)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jiko Kisasa (imported)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kuni Okoa (imported)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Eco zoom 5000 (imported)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rubkona Rocket (locally produced)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Each stove type was scored and ranked after the results of the testing were collected and focus group discussions on user preferences completed. The evaluation scale ranged from 0 to 5, with 0 indicating “very poor performance” and 5 indicating “excellent performance”. The results are presented in the table above.
VERIFICATION PROCESS. As a condition to release the cash grant, stoves were verified according to the following criteria: i) the stove must be dry; ii) it must not have any significant cracks; iii) it must have a fuel entry point, air-inlet and fuel chamber; and iv) it must be constructed on a plain surface. The size of the stove may vary according to each household’s unique preferences and needs.

REDEMPTION OF CASH-FOR-WORK VOUCHER. Upon verification of the stoves, project staff distributed a carbon-copy receipt to eligible heads of household that could be exchanged for SSP 700 at the designated cash distribution point. The redemption of these vouchers was done by staff checking unique pre-printed numbers (valid only for one day) off a tally sheet.

TARGETING
There were two beneficiary selection processes. For the stove construction, the project targeted almost 90 per cent of the total number of households in the site. In coordination with all concerned residents, a focal point was identified for each shelter that was responsible for interacting with the organization, constructing the stove and receiving the cash-for-work grant. A total of 11,180 focal persons were selected for 11,180 shelters. As most shelters were communal, residents had to agree on who within the shelter would receive the grant.

For the skills training, the construction assistants were selected in coordination with all relevant stakeholders within the site, including the women’s committee, youth committee, block leaders and the chiefs’ high committee. The process was guided by three key criteria:

- All geographical sections within the site should be equally represented. Each sector should be home to at least 15 per cent of the total number of training participants.
- Individuals whose livelihood opportunities could be negatively affected by a decrease of firewood consumption within the site should be given priority. Due to the gender dimension of fuel collection, at least 60 per cent of construction assistants should be female.
- Idle youth without access to any other income should be prioritized. At least 80 per cent of construction assistants should be between 18 and 25 years old.

MAIN CHALLENGES
RENT-SEEKING BEHAVIOUR FROM ARMED ACTORS. The local traders were being arbitrarily taxed by local authorities, so had to find more effective mechanisms to deliver materials, such as optimizing delivery times and reducing the accesses to the site, to also reduce the number of times they would get taxed.

UNFAMILIARITY WITH PARTICIPATORY APPROACHES. Initially, people would ask what they were going to receive, rather than how they could be involved. This was due to the negative impact that in-kind distributions had over time on their attitudes. It took the project team time to get the community fully involved.

CURRENCY FLUCTUATIONS. Due to the volatility of the South Sudanese Pound, the longer the project duration, the more chances of the value of the cash grant changing, as it was a fixed amount. For this reason, the team needed to ensure that the completion of the stove and the verification process were done on time.

CAPACITY OF THE ORGANIZATION TO IMPLEMENT. The organization did not have yet the programmatic expertise and operational capacities required to implement a cash-transfer programme smoothly. To address this, programme staff organized weekly meetings with finance and procurement staff to align the process with standard financial management rules and procedures. Efforts at improving communication between programme staff and support units proved highly successful. Payment of suppliers and cash distribution plans were established to allow for a certain flexibility as required on the ground (for example, delays in service delivery due to fluctuating stocks or vehicle breakdowns).

WIDER IMPACTS OF THE PROJECT
By adopting a community-led approach, the project sought to strengthen resilience and self-sufficiency, engaging in partnership with local leaders and entrepreneurs, as well as other stakeholders such as women and youth. The cash-based intervention promoted local ownership and sustainability, as the community was closely involved in all stages of the project cycle. The skills training provided participants with a livelihood skill that could become an income-generating activity beyond the site. This may serve to address humanitarian needs in the long term, by reducing underlying vulnerabilities, such as unemployment and scarcity of cooking fuel.
STRENGTHS, WEAKNESSES AND LESSONS LEARNED

STRENGTHS

+ High community involvement throughout the project. The project also had a focus on women’s empowerment through their strong participation — specifically during stove design process, training and construction.

+ The project built on local capacities by engaging local actors and conducting skills training. As a result, 96 per cent of targeted households reported to be capable of building the stoves, 95 per cent that they could teach someone else the building skills, and 92 per cent that they would be able to maintain and repair their own stove. The skills-transfer process was organic and self-sufficient, only requiring the initial training for 20 selected women in the pilot area before rapidly spreading to cover 1,280 people in the site.

+ The cash-based approach was cost-effective as it engaged multiple local traders to provide locally available materials, resulting in cost reductions of 59 per cent compared to the distribution of imported stoves.

+ Local ownership was promoted by identifying a stove which was in line with traditional cooking practices and made of local materials. The majority of the women who participated in the project used the stove (98%) and were satisfied with it (99%). Satisfaction was mainly due to fuel efficiency, cooking quality, smoke reduction and ease of use. Preparation times were lower because the stove was well insulated, better preserving the heat.

+ Fewer women had to collect firewood daily after the project, reducing associated GBV and safety risks (only 1% of women interviewed, as opposed to 7% before the project).

+ The stoves reduced smoke pollution, with positive effects on people’s health and well-being. This was thanks to their compact structure and the space between the cooking pot and the open flame.

WEAKNESSES

- Internal delays prevented the project from finishing earlier, due to several ongoing cash-based interventions and because the operational capacity and expertise of the organization in such projects was not yet fully in place.

- The main construction material was not available on site. Although cow dung was available in a nearby town, it was not readily available within the PoC. The project team could have researched how the community could access cow dung from the outside, if a market for cow dung was possible, or if there were available sources within the site itself.

- The project did not have any special measures on inclusion of people with special needs, such as those with physical disabilities or heightened vulnerabilities, or marginalized groups. This resulted in these groups being unable to participate in the project.

- As this project had a GBV risk mitigation component, the project team could have collaborated more with GBV and Protection actors. This could have enabled a better identification of special needs of vulnerable groups and their inclusion in the project. Tools could have been designed to assess GBV risks and mitigating factors, and joint monitoring could have better informed the organization about GBV risks and interventions that may have been overlooked.

LESSONS LEARNED

• Start community sensitization and solicit buy-in for the project well in advance of implementation, as cash is time-consuming, particularly when it involves beneficiary participation. Community involvement was ensured in all stages of the project cycle and was key to avoid increased tensions between various groups in the site and beyond.

• The terms of engagement with traders need to be communicated continuously, from the tendering to the selection stage, to address questions and issues, as well as to mitigate any potential tension. Although participation criteria and minimum capacities required were communicated to all traders who were vying for the position, ineligible traders still hoped to be selected and tensions between them started to rise until the selected traders were announced.

• Understand potential challenges in importing materials into a site and make sure local traders understand all barriers they may face (e.g. the issue of arbitrary taxation), before agreeing on terms of reference.

• Ensure that transportation and other logistics are adequate and ensured by the trader. This should be included in the terms of reference, with penalties in case these are not fulfilled.

• Ensure a proper conflict analysis prior to project design and implementation. Fighting occurred on a regular basis in the site and it was often related to tensions within the trader community. Project staff decided to engage with outside traders as a precautionary measure, following consultations with community leadership in the site.
**SOUTH SUDAN 2017–2018 / CONFLICT (IDP)**

**KEYWORDS:** Shelter upgrades, Voucher fairs, Cash for work, Community engagement

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<td>SHELTER SIZE</td>
<td>Communal shelters of 75m² (15m by 5m), comprising five partitions of 15m² each</td>
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**PROJECT SUMMARY**

The project upgraded 804 communal shelters in the Wau Protection of Civilians (PoC) site as part of a large-scale rehabilitation, by using local materials to protect tarpaulins. All procurement was local and a consortium of small-scale traders within the site was established. Materials were distributed through voucher fairs and the beneficiaries were responsible for installing the upgrades themselves. The project also included skills training on bamboo thatched walls and a cash-for-work grant.

**STRENGTHS**

+ Engagement of beneficiaries strengthened their self-sufficiency.  
+ Local procurement through multiple small traders led to savings.  
+ Increased economic activity in the local market.  
+ Shelter lifespan was increased, reducing maintenance costs.  
+ High beneficiary satisfaction.

**WEAKNESSES**

- Low community interest in the skill-development component.  
- The gender roles and responsibilities were not properly assessed.  
- Limited covered living space.  
- Contracts did not include applicable penalty clauses.  
- Some materials were not properly used.

**MATERIALS COST**

- USD 50 for upgrades per shelter partition (USD 24 per household)  
- USD 21 for maintenance per shelter partition (USD 13 per household)

**PROJECT COST**

- USD 42 per household

**SHELTER DENSITY**

- 2.6m² per person

* Figures as of December 2017. South Sudan HRP 2018.  
** DTM, April 2018.

**TOTAL PEOPLE**

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**PROJECT BENEFICIARIES**

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**PROJECT OUTPUTS**

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- 300 individuals trained
- 3,012 households received cash for work

**OUTCOME INDICATORS**

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One of the upgrades consisted of adding a layer of dry elephant grass to rooftops to increase protection from the elements, improve ventilation and lower inside temperatures.

CONTEXT IN WAU


The Protection of Civilians site (PoC) in Wau was established in June 2016 after intense fighting in the country’s north-western region prompted tens of thousands to flee their homes in search of refuge near the existing UN Mission base in Wau town. By the end of 2016, more than 30,000 people were living on less than 100,000 square meters of land in what was the most congested PoC site in South Sudan. Following conflict in Wau town and periphery in April 2017, the site experienced a large IDP influx of up to 18,000 persons, significantly worsening living conditions. An intention survey carried out in November 2017, indicated that two thirds of interviewees intended to remain in their current displacement site because of access to security. Whilst some households left the site, the security environment did not improve significantly in Wau and high levels of congestion were likely to persist. By March 2018, the PoC site hosted 22,579 IDPs, while a further 12,796 IDPs sought shelter at five collective sites in Wau Town.

Due to the extreme density of the site, IDPs occupied communal shelters hosting five households each, as per the design approved by the Shelter-NFI Cluster. The shelters were covered in plastic sheeting and organized in blocks, further grouped in three zones.

PROJECT GOALS

Fitting into the resilience-based approaches of the Shelter-NFI Cluster, mainly built around cash-based interventions, the project goal was to improve the living conditions of IDPs through the provision of shelter upgrades, using a participatory approach and local solutions. It also included multisectoral activities, such as protection, food security and livelihoods.

PILOT PHASE

From January to March 2017, the organization conducted a cash-based pilot project in zone C, to upgrade communal shelters improving the lifespan of plastic sheets used for roofs and walls from three to six months. Following the success of the pilot, the organization replicated the project in zones A and B from December 2017 to March 2018, as part of a large-scale rehabilitation of the site.

PROJECT IMPLEMENTATION

The project was implemented by a team of 11 staff: one operation officer, two project assistants, four enumerators (gender-balanced) and four supervisors. The team was coordinated from Juba and had the support of the camp management unit of the organization.

The upgrades consisted of adding a layer of dry elephant grass – found naturally in surrounding areas – to rooftops to increase protection from the elements, improve ventilation and lower inside temperatures. Further, bamboo-thatched walls and doors were installed around the shelter exterior, increasing privacy and further extending the durability of shelters.

All materials required for the upgrades were delivered through voucher fairs. Materials were procured locally through small-scale traders residing within the site – many of whom were struggling to maintain business due to the crisis. The beneficiaries themselves undertook all labour associated with installing the upgrades and were incentivized by a cash-for-work programme.

SKILLS TRAINING. The project involved a three-day skills training for 300 individuals on how to construct bamboo-thatched walls and doors for shelters. The team selected participants (50% women) from within the whole site and worked closely with community leaders, block leaders, women and youth committees to ensure equal representation of participants. Training participants were identified from each block. At the end of the training, each participant was provided with a training completion certificate and a grant of USD 9.

VOUCHER DISTRIBUTION. Commodity vouchers were designed for both phases of upgrades and were restricted to the specific type of material and quantity needed. The vouchers were used not only as legal tender for the exchange of upgrade materials during the market fairs, but also to act as proof of registration for eligible participants. It was through the vouchers that the traders kept track of the households they served and the project team verified the traders’ claims before redeeming the vouchers.

The process below was followed:

• To keep track of each household’s address, a system of numbering shelters and partitions within each shelter was established;

• The targeted beneficiaries were registered by linking the serial number of the voucher to a specific name and their address within the PoC. This was done by means of making house-calls on the voucher distribution day;

Following the success of the shelter upgrade pilot in Zone C, the organization replicated the project in Zone A of the site by upgrading 375 newly constructed communal shelter.

VOUCHER DISTRIBUTION. Commodity vouchers were designed for both phases of upgrades and were restricted to the specific type of material and quantity needed. The vouchers were used not only as legal tender for the exchange of upgrade materials during the market fairs, but also to act as proof of registration for eligible participants. It was through the vouchers that the traders kept track of the households they served and the project team verified the traders’ claims before redeeming the vouchers.

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• The targeted beneficiaries were registered by linking the serial number of the voucher to a specific name and their address within the PoC. This was done by means of making house-calls on the voucher distribution day;
• The serial number and address were noted by project staff on each voucher before the distribution;
• All traders were provided with a specific vendor identification number which they noted on each received voucher;
• Project staff then used the beneficiary name, serial number and address along with the vendor ID to verify the list of served beneficiaries as per traders. Each voucher was attached to the list as a receipt;
• Traders were only reimbursed after the verification exercise, which started as soon as the vouchers had expired and were handed over by the traders.

VOUCHER FAIRS AND INSTALLATION. From each shelter, one household was elected to be responsible for receiving shelter materials and completing the required work. A designated space was prepared in the market where traders lined up the materials and beneficiaries brought their vouchers in exchange for these materials. Upon reception of the elephant grass and bamboo-thatched walls in two different phases, beneficiaries were responsible for their installation, with the technical guidance of supervisors from the project team.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Items</th>
<th>Units</th>
<th>Qty</th>
<th>Unit cost (USD)</th>
<th>Total cost (USD)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Elephant grass (bundles Ø30-40 cm)</td>
<td>bundles</td>
<td>50</td>
<td>1.53</td>
<td>76.50</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rubber rope (20 strings per bundle/50cm length)</td>
<td>bundles</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>1.36</td>
<td>13.60</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bamboo (300 cm x Ø3-5 cm), 10 pcs per bundle</td>
<td>bundles</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>6.40</td>
<td>25.60</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Thatch bamboo for walls (170x200cm)</td>
<td>pcs</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>5.10</td>
<td>51.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Thatch bamboo for door (170x100cm)</td>
<td>pcs</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>2.97</td>
<td>29.70</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Thatch bamboo for side walls (10.5m²)</td>
<td>pcs</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>26.00</td>
<td>52.00</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

VERIFICATION AND CASH-FOR-WORK. Project staff supervised the upgrades and ensured these were completed in a satisfactory manner before approving the beneficiary to move on to the next phase of the voucher distribution. In case the upgrade was incomplete or inadequate, the staff provided feedback and instruction as to what had to be done before the next visit. To guide the verification process, the staff made use of a simple monitoring checklist, designed to ensure quick and consistent assessments. Upon successful completion and verification, beneficiaries were given a cash grant worth USD 5 to supplement household income.

COMMUNITY ENGAGEMENT. The community played a central role in almost all aspects of programme implementation, proving a crucial partner in the process of selecting traders, responding to feedback and complaints and organizing the skills trainings. Project staff initiated a comprehensive sensitization campaign at the outset, starting by presenting the project to the community leadership in the site. Community consultations were designed to encourage the population to actively participate in the project design and implementation. As a result of such consultations, it was decided to engage the women and youth committees in identifying both participants and trainers for the bamboo thatch skills trainings.

The chiefs’ committee assisted in verifying the selected traders, by providing documentation confirming their legitimate right to conduct business within the PoC. The block leaders were tasked with going door-to-door in their respective blocks to explain the nature of the project to the community.

MAIN CHALLENGES

LOW PARTICIPATION. Although women installed bamboo-thatched walls, they did not participate actively in elephant grass installation on the roof, mainly because in the local culture this task was conducted by men. Men’s participation was comparatively low all throughout shelter upgrades, primarily because of lack of willingness and sense of ownership. Although regular follow-ups and sensitization activities were conducted, the levels of participation did not improve.

LIMITED SPACE TO SET UP A MARKET. Due to limited space within the site, initially the organization could not establish a marketplace within the PoC, which would have reduced the distance between market and targeted shelters. Later, the market was placed inside the gates.

DELAY IN MATERIALS SUPPLY. Regular follow-up meetings and visits were conducted with the traders and, as a last resort, transportation support was provided by the organization to ensure the timely delivery of supplies.

MISUSE OF MATERIALS BY THE COMMUNITY. Women took part of elephant grass intended for the roof and used it to cook. Although shelter supervisors conducted regular field visits to ensure the proper use of materials, more mobilization would have been required. Nevertheless, the materials distributed were enough to complete the works even in such cases.

WIDER IMPACTS OF THE PROJECT

The project was highly participatory and built on local capacities. Through active engagement with traditional and informal leadership structures, business leaders and women and youth groups, the project transferred expertise and knowledge to improve people’s living conditions and equip the community with new skills. Allowing the community to assume increased responsibility in this process served to restore dignity and strengthen their self-sufficiency. 11 out of 15 traders engaged in the project were able to expand their business, primarily in selling a variety of items such as seeds, shoes and timber (four traders), or expanding their shelter material business (three traders). Traders also found the process of cooperating with other traders useful and beneficial and they were planning to collectively open a multi-purpose shop in the town soon.

![Image](image-url)
STRENGTHS, WEAKNESSES AND LESSONS LEARNED

STRENGTHS

+ Active engagement of beneficiaries in improving their living conditions contributed to the restoration of dignity and strengthened community self-sufficiency.

+ Procurement of locally available materials involving multiple small-scale local traders through a cash-based modality, which was 40 per cent cheaper compared to in-kind distribution.

+ Increased economic activity in the local market, creating employment opportunities and stimulating entrepreneurship within and outside the site. As a result of the project, 73 per cent of traders expanded their business or ventured into new lucrative areas.

+ The lifespan of shelters was increased from 3–6 to 12–18 months, thus maintenance was reduced to once rather than twice a year. This represents a USD 433 savings per communal shelter, or approx. USD 87 per household.

+ High beneficiary satisfaction (84% versus 52% before the project) measured through seven metrics (quality and shelter type 94%; comfort 92%; privacy 82%; environment for children to study 67%; sense of security 86%; weather impacts / heat in the shelter 77%; social interaction within the shelter 91%).

WEAKNESSES

- Low community interest and participation in the skill-development component of the project. Firstly, this was due to limited community mobilization for the specific component. Secondly, people did not see much use of the skill and trade beyond the shelter upgrade activities within the camp.

- The gender roles and responsibilities were not properly assessed, leading to low male participation in the shelter upgrade and the need to hire labourers. This was mainly because the project was conducted during the dry season and men were engaged in other remunerated activities outside the site.

- The project could not address the issue of insufficient covered living space of the communal shelter solution, which was due to the high influx of population within the enclosed perimeter of the site.

- Contracts did not include applicable penalty clauses to be imposed on the traders in the event of any delays and substandard quality.

- Some materials were not properly used. More mobilization should have been carried out with the community to ensure proper use of the assistance.

LESSONS LEARNED

• In-depth analysis should be conducted for the gender role and responsibilities in different ethnic groups of the community and should be incorporated in the project. For future interventions, the organization aimed to address the above issues of participation by developing a calendar with the community, to understand their gender roles and seasonal activities throughout the year.

• Detailed studies should be carried out – after training needs assessment have been conducted – to identify skills and trades that are appropriate to the local contexts, specifically the trades that generate livelihoods and those which can be useful outside camp settings, such as carpentry, masonry, welding, etc.
**CASE STUDY**

**SOUTH SUDAN 2018 / CONFLICT (IDP)**

**KEYWORDS:** Site planning, Site rehabilitation, Shelter construction, Coordination, Community engagement

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>CRISIS</th>
<th>South Sudan Civil War, December 2013–onwards</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>TOTAL PEOPLE AFFECTED*</td>
<td>7 million individuals, as of Dec 2017</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TOTAL PEOPLE DISPLACED*</td>
<td>1.9 million individuals displaced (over 265,000 individuals settled in PoC sites)**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PROJECT LOCATION</td>
<td>Malakal Protection of Civilian (PoC) site, Upper Nile state</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PROJECT BENEFICIARIES</td>
<td>1,242 households (3,856 individuals) received shelter support</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PROJECT BENEFICIARIES</td>
<td>Over 5,200 households (29,000 individuals) benefiting from site reconfiguration and infrastructure upgrade</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PROJECT OUTPUTS</td>
<td>959 individual shelters built (238 blocks)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PROJECT OUTPUTS</td>
<td>64 carpenters trained on shelter construction</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PROJECT OUTPUTS</td>
<td>206 heads of households trained on shelter maintenance</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PROJECT OUTPUTS</td>
<td>Site works: clearing and grading, drainage and roads improved, culverts installed</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SHELTER SIZE</td>
<td>13.5m² (4.5x3m)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SHELTER DENSITY</td>
<td>3.4m² per person on average</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MATERIALS COST</td>
<td>USD 201 per shelter (USD 804 per block, including labour)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PROJECT COST</td>
<td>USD 280 per household</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**PROJECT SUMMARY**

As part of the wider rehabilitation of the whole site, the project targeted a sector in the Malakal Protection of Civilians site to reconfigure its layout and address issues of overcrowding, security, flood risk and poor distribution of services. One organization was in charge of the site planning and development, while another led the community mobilization, site management and shelter components. Robust emergency shelters according to Cluster-agreed designs were provided to the residents of the reconfigured sector of the site, through a highly consultative process.

* Figures as of December 2017. South Sudan HRP 2018.
** DTM, April 2018.

**TIMELINE**

Sep–Dec 2017, Planning phase: Community discussions conducted prior to start of activities.
Jan–Apr 2018, Phase 1: Community mobilization, demonstration of prototype and community consultations informing project design.
Apr–Jul 2018, Phase 2: Demolition, relocation to transit site, site planning, shelter construction in sector 4.

**STRENGTHS**

+ Procurement challenges were anticipated and delays avoided.
+ Community participation throughout the project.
+ Equitable and effective shelter allocation process.
+ Good coordination and collaboration with all stakeholders.
+ Effective collaboration with peacekeeping forces.

**WEAKNESSES**

- Community resistance and disagreements were not anticipated.
- Initial gaps in coordination between partners.
- The small transit site limited the pace and efficiency of the project.
The conditions in the Malakal PoC were particularly grim, especially after the new population influxes in 2017 and during the rainy season.

CONTEXT

For more background information, see overview A.23 in Shelter Projects 2015–2016, and A.6 in this edition.

Over three years into the conflict, fighting intensified in the first half of 2017, causing further displacement across the country.

SITUATION IN MALAKAL

Malakal is amongst the largest towns in South Sudan and had a thriving market before the conflict. Since late 2013 when the conflict started, the town experienced heavy fighting that caused large-scale damage and displacement. Many people sought refuge in the Protection of Civilians (PoC) site within the peacekeeping base.

As it was never intended to become a long-term settlement, the site conditions soon became very dire, particularly during the rainy season. Four years after its establishment, and because of new population influxes in 2017, the site required rehabilitation due to uneven distribution of common facilities and infrastructure, as well as disorganized location and density of shelter areas.

The main issues in the PoC included congestion and overcrowding, encroachment of roads, lack of privacy for families sharing communal shelters, as well as the overall deterioration of shelters. Recurrent flooding affected the site, due to collapse of drainage and lack of tertiary drainage. The environment also contributed to increasing risks to safety and security, including gender-based violence.

SITE REHABILITATION PROGRAMME

Site planning and development activities in South Sudan were coordinated under the Camp Coordination and Camp Management (CCCM) Cluster. In line with the CCCM and Shelter-NFI Cluster strategies, and building on the experiences of the PoCs in Bentiu and Wau, two organizations and the CCCM Cluster led the rehabilitation process of the Malakal PoC between 2017 and 2018, with the support of the peacekeeping mission.

Organization A – which was in charge of site management in the site since 2014 – led the community mobilization and shelter construction components, while Organization B was the overall lead of site planning and site development across the site. This case study focuses on the reconfiguration process of sector 4.

PLANNING PHASE

Standard Operating Procedures were developed to guide the process, an inclusive community consultation and sensitization plan was created, and community specialized committees established to support the communication with site residents on the reconfiguration. Mass communication campaigns were conducted to ensure the population at large was informed.

Two prototype shelters were constructed for exhibition, allowing for dialogue with community members and helping to further refine the design in a participatory manner.

A transit site was established next to sector 4 and used to gradually move people and clear areas of the old site. Due to its small size, the speed of the relocation and rehabilitation process was slow.

Map showing the drainages (in dark red) and roads (in dark blue) rehabilitated as part of the site upgrade. This case study focuses on sector 4 of the site.
SHELTER DESIGN
The objectives of the new shelter design were to increase the minimum covered living space, improve privacy and dignity for users and provide a more robust and durable solution, compared to the existing communal shelters. New shelters were taller than the old ones, to enable better ventilation and had roof overhangs to provide shading for outdoor activities.

Organization A initially designed a 9m² shelter in consultation with the Shelter Cluster, for an average household of three members. However, the shelter design was later revised to accommodate the increased number of people arriving in the PoC and the average household size. The shelters were arranged in blocks, with each individual unit measuring 3x4.5m. Household sizes ranged from three to eight persons, with an average of five. Shelters were designed for up to four people, so for larger families two shelters were allocated, with the option to remove the internal partition if desired. For polygamous families, shelter allocation was based on the number of wives and children.

The involvement of IDP committees was essential in the process of shelter allocation. For example, the organization initially planned to move some of the households to other sectors in the site, due to the large population in sector 4. In order not to separate families from the same groups, community representatives suggested to allocate one shelter for households of up to five members, even if this meant that they would have less living space.

BENEFICIARY REGISTRATION
Once Organization B completed the site plan and collected biometric data of residents in sector 4, Organization A conducted the beneficiary registration process. This was sensitive, as one of the potential risks was that residents from other sectors would claim shelters in the reconfigured sector. Households were mapped to ensure relatives and people from the same group would be resettled together, as well as to identify and prioritize vulnerable individuals and consider specific protection needs in the allocation process. Conducting the allocation in the design stage also aimed at involving beneficiaries earlier on, as they would be responsible for the construction of their shelters.

A complaints desk was established jointly by site management and protection actors, to assist people with special needs and those who had not been registered.

REHABILITATION PROCESS
Organization A established a transit site with 459 tents and storage spaces in an empty area adjacent to sector 4. In coordination with WASH partners, it upgraded the existing latrines and bathing facilities, and built four communal spaces and kitchens.

The rehabilitation was phased, starting with residents in the most congested blocks, who were first moved into the transit site. The site management team supported the verification and relocation of individuals from their shelters to the transit site and deployed additional personnel to manage it.

Site management staff carried out regular sensitization and awareness campaigns on the maintenance of available services at the transit site.

During the rehabilitation, the organization coordinated the monitoring, identification and demolition of unauthorized structures along the WASH corridors to create more space for facilities, and maintain road infrastructure to facilitate service delivery. A total of 83 shelters were dismantled.

In blocks were people had already moved, old shelters were dismantled and the site cleared, mainly through community mobilization. Organization B conducted the initial earthworks, including grading and levelling, decommissioned the old drainage and excavated the new channels and roads according to the site plan. Soil was sourced from a nearby quarry and transported on site for backfilling, grading and compacting of the ground for the blocks. Finally, tertiary drainage around shelter blocks was excavated.

Once the space was rehabilitated, levelled and shelters were built, IDPs were allocated to newly constructed shelters.

Close coordination with the protection team sought to ensure that persons with specific needs were prioritized in the shelter reallocation and that their position in the new layout was close to services and WASH facilities.
**SHELTER CONSTRUCTION AND TRAINING**

New shelters in each rehabilitated blocks were built involving site residents. Local carpenters were trained on shelter construction and maintenance, and were responsible for plot demarcation and sizing of materials to ensure speed and efficiency. Fifty-four community members were trained in demarcation, set-out, shelter construction and maintenance. These then trained their assistants on-the-job. Shelters were built through cash for work in blocks of four to six units, aiming to maximize available space for infrastructure and services.

The organization also conducted training to households within each block on shelter maintenance and site management, with a focus on avoiding construction of unauthorized structures and on fire safety.

This process ensured residents could participate in the construction and, even more importantly, in the care and maintenance phase, as well as earning an income in the process.

**MATERIALS AND SUPPLY**

The phased relocation approach allowed for a phased procurement of materials and easy storage, which minimized damage and loss of assets.

The shelters were made of timber and plastic sheeting for walling and roofing. Almost all materials were sourced outside Malakal, due to the unavailability in the local market and to protect the already dilapidated physical environment from further deterioration.

Initially, Organization A had considered acquiring most materials from the Shelter-NFI pipeline. However, the pipeline could only provide plastic sheeting used for the partitions, so the organization engaged certified suppliers authorized by the government to harvest poles in surrounding counties and monitor the transport to the site.

Materials were transported through the Logistics Cluster, which meant that the delivery was relatively slow, as it relied on their schedule and priorities. Most materials were stored off site, while three containers were moved to the site to pre-position items during the phased construction.

Organization A procured two timber cutting machines and constructed a workshop on site. Shelter staff trained five carpenters in the PoC on general operation of the saw machines, as well as on how to size the timbers at different angles, and trained casual workers on how to protect timber against termites. Timbers were cut in the required lengths as per the design and bundled as kits for each block.

Organization B took care of the mobilization of site clearing equipment and the procurement of culverts.

**COORDINATION**

The site management team, with the support of the CCCM Cluster, acted as a bridge between service providers and site residents to ensure gaps could be reported and service delivery was efficient. In this capacity, Organization A maintained essential communal infrastructure such as footbridges, communication centres, community halls and recreational areas.

It also supported the dissemination of information products from partners, to create awareness on services available to mitigate and address protection risks within the PoC. This campaign was then expanded to the host community through outreach teams and the delivery of leaflets on Protection from Sexual Exploitation and Abuse (PSEA) and referral pathways.

The organization established and circulated a quarterly community meeting calendar amongst all partners, to ensure that meetings with various groups were properly coordinated, and to promote participation. Moreover, to respond to community engagement challenges in the early phases, the organization facilitated bi-weekly meetings between agencies and camp leadership structures to share updates, coordinate aid delivery and ensure that assistance reached the most vulnerable.

**MAIN CHALLENGES**

**ACCESS AND LOGISTICS.** Shipping of materials was delayed due to insecurity around Malakal, and heavy rains affected the site development works. One machine broke down, but was fixed using the standby mechanics who were employed for regular repairs.

**UNDERSTANDING OF TECHNICAL STANDARDS.** Initially, community leaders struggled to understand the standards used for site layout, width of roads, drainage and distance from shelters to latrines. Using prototypes and demonstrations on the ground helped explain these concepts to the community and solve any disagreement.

**COMMUNITY RESISTANCE.** Several hurdles with community youth occurred during the rehabilitation process. These included disagreements over the occupancy rate and number of shelters per block, which led to the stopping of demarcation works, and over a pay rise due to currency inflation, which caused workers to go on strike. Prolonged negotiations and a re-calculation of the pay rate solved these issues. In one instance, violence against project staff required the mediation of peacekeepers and the redesign of the proposed block layout.

**PROTECTION AND COMMUNITY ENGAGEMENT**

As part of a separate PSEA initiative, Organization A – together with another agency – conducted awareness sessions for men and women separately, trained community committees and set up a Community-Based Complaint Mechanism across the site.

Community-led protection structures were supported with incentives and involved in decision-making on key initiatives. Beneficiaries were consulted on the reconfiguration plan through focus group discussions with youth, elderly and women’s group, as well as by involving community leaders.

The organization also promoted participation of 50 per cent men and women in camp leadership structures, and ensured age, gender and area of origin were equally represented in community committees.
STRENGTHS, WEAKNESSES AND LESSONS LEARNED

STRENGTHS

+ Procurement delays were anticipated and alternative materials stocked as contingency (e.g. bamboos to replace timbers). To overcome transport delays from the logistics base to the site, additional storage space and vehicles were secured to pre-position items on site.

+ Participation and engagement of the community at all stages of the project.

+ Equitable and effective shelter allocation process. This was possible thanks to the collaboration of site management, protection and registration teams from the two organizations.

+ Good coordination and collaboration with all stakeholders, both at inter-cluster level and between the two implementing organizations.

+ Effective collaboration with peacekeeping forces proved instrumental in overcoming issues with the community and providing logistical support when needed, also thanks to the joint monitoring visits conducted with the two implementing organizations.

WEAKNESSES

- The extent of initial resistance and demands from community members were not sufficiently anticipated, despite the strong community engagement component.

- Initial gaps in coordination between partners meant that communities were often unilaterally engaged and schedules not aligned. To help coordinated resources and activities, a common plan, a calendar for community mobilization activities and regular operational meetings were set up.

- The small size of the transit site limited the number of households that could be relocated and impacted on the intervention capacity. The transit site could only accommodate one block of households at a time, thus relocation, site development and shelter construction were limited to the size of the vacated block.

MATERIALS LIST FOR A STANDARD BLOCK

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Items</th>
<th>Units</th>
<th>Qty</th>
<th>Unit cost (USD)</th>
<th>Total cost (USD)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>2x4&quot; Hardwood timbers</td>
<td>pcs</td>
<td>58</td>
<td>4.9</td>
<td>284.20</td>
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<tr>
<td>2x2&quot; Hardwood timbers, 4m long</td>
<td>pcs</td>
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<td>2.79</td>
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<tr>
<td>4x5m plastic sheet</td>
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<tr>
<td>Bamboo</td>
<td>bundles</td>
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<tr>
<td>Binding wire</td>
<td>kg</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>1.6</td>
<td>6.40</td>
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<tr>
<td>Nails 4&quot;, 3&quot; and 2&quot;</td>
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<td>Rubber washer</td>
<td>packet</td>
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<td>5</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nylon ropes (30 m/roll)</td>
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<td>4</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>20.00</td>
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<tr>
<td>Labour for construction</td>
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<td>1</td>
<td>65</td>
<td>65.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Transportation, loading and offloading</td>
<td>lump sum</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>5.00</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Grand total per block 804.50

Average cost per individual shelter 201.13

LESSONS LEARNED

• Managing community expectations. Shelter prototypes should display the same size of blocks and exact types of materials as will be used for the actual construction, as any deviation will be a cause for disagreement and contention.

• Continuous engagement of the IDP committees was vital to the reconfiguration process. Some of the suggestions made by community representatives – including around the shelter allocation by household size – contributed to the project’s success.

• Holding meetings outside the targeted sector of the site provided a more conducive environment to address issues, especially after the incident that involved violence against staff.
CASE STUDY  
**UGANDA 2017–2018 / SOUTH SUDAN CRISIS**

**KEYWORDS:** Shelter construction, Community engagement, Local techniques / capacity, GBV risk mitigation

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>CRISIS</th>
<th>South Sudan Civil War (refugees in Uganda), December 2013–onwards</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>
| TOTAL NUMBER OF REFUGEES* | 1.06 million South Sudanese refugees in Uganda  
2.48 million total South Sudanese refugees in six neighbouring asylum countries |
| PROJECT LOCATION | Rhino and Palorinya settlements (Arua and Moyo districts) |
| REFUGEES IN PROJECT LOCATIONS | 181,657 individuals as of 30 Jun 2017  
(the vast majority from South Sudan) |
| NEEDS IN PROJECT LOCATIONS | Rhino (July 2017):  
Shelter needs: 27% of profiled households  
14,861 people with special needs identified  
Palorinya (May 2016): 4,010 people with special needs |
| PROJECT BENEFICIARIES | 1,020 households with persons with special needs |
| PROJECT OUTPUTS | 1,020 semi-permanent shelters and latrines  
870 youth participated in cash-for-work activities |
| SHELTER SIZE | 25.4m² (Rhino) and 17.6m² (Palorinya) |
| SHELTER DENSITY | 5.1m² per person (Rhino) and 3.5m² (Palorinya) |
| MATERIALS COST PER HOUSEHOLD | USD 1,676 (Rhino) and USD 913 (Palorinya) |
| PROJECT COST PER HOUSEHOLD | USD 1,884 (Rhino) and USD 1,146 (Palorinya) |

**PROJECT SUMMARY**

Two organizations working in two different refugee settlements built 1,020 semi-permanent shelters and latrines for South Sudanese refugees. The project targeted households with vulnerable individuals, such as elderly people, survivors of gender-based violence, and people with disabilities. Two different shelters were constructed using traditional techniques and locally available materials. Both refugee and host community youth were actively engaged through a cash-for-work component.

**TIMELINE**

1. Aug 2017: The number of South Sudanese refugees in Uganda surpasses one million after steady growth since the start of the conflict.
2. Aug 2017: The organization requests additional funds to include a shelter component to the emergency response.
3. Aug 2017: Project planning and shelter designs completed. Selection of the most vulnerable households in the settlements.
4. Sep 2017: Project start. Community mobilization and presentation of project objectives. The government and host communities approve and hand over land for brick production and construction work.

**WEAKNESSES**

- Procurement and logistical delays.
- Allocation of insufficient funds limited project targets.
- Continuous staff turnover.
- Plans should have considered access and weather constraints.
- Issues of quality and engagement in the rendering process.
- Time for planning and community engagement was not considered.

**STRENGTHS**

+ Effective coordination improved efficiency.
+ Use of local materials and building cultures.
+ Engagement of youth.
+ Income opportunities and market revitalization.
+ The community supported the most vulnerable in the construction.
+ Including host communities strengthened peaceful coexistence.
Following the government’s refugee strategy, the organization and a partner chose to target both the host community and the refugees in their shelter interventions. They also collaborated with the district local government authorities to incorporate the needs of refugees in their District Development Plan and the ongoing implementation of local services.

**TARGETING**

The initial beneficiary list was prepared by community mobilization teams through assessments specifically designed to identify people with special needs. Multi-stakeholder committees composed of representatives from the government and the sector lead agency provided additional inputs and validated the lists.

In addition to prioritizing new arrivals, vulnerability criteria were used, such as youth at risk, single women, elderly and persons with serious health conditions, disabilities or physical protection needs.

**PROJECT IMPLEMENTATION**

**TEAM AND APPROACH.** Between the two partners, 40 staff were involved in implementing shelter activities in two different locations. Staff members from one of the organizations’ office in Tanzania went on an exchange mission to Uganda to share the experience and lessons learned from a similar project. Instead of using contractors, the two partners trained and employed youth from the host and refugee communities to construct semi-permanent shelters and latrines for vulnerable households using a cash-for-work modality.

Land for shelter and agricultural use was allocated by the government and two different shelter prototypes were approved and built in each district. Before early 2018 there was no sector-level agreed design.

Throughout the project, the two organizations conducted extensive community mobilization activities, including hazard mapping and village planning.

**ENGAGEMENT OF YOUTH.** A sensitization campaign was carried out in the project locations to identify young people interested in construction work and brick production. Several meetings were carried out with refugee and host community members to discuss the goals and benefits of the project. Refugee welfare committees (established settlement leadership structures) played a key role in the mobilization of youth and registration of beneficiaries.

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1 UNHCR, 2018–2025 Uganda Shelter Strategy.
2 The Refugee and Host Population Empowerment (ReHOPE) Strategy.

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**BACKGROUND**

For more background information, see overview A.23 in Shelter Projects 2015-2016 and A.6 in this edition.

More than three years since the beginning of the South Sudan crisis, Uganda hosted over one million South Sudanese refugees. Approximately 87 per cent of them were women, children and youth, many of whom fled across the border alone and arrived weak and malnourished.

**SITUATION BEFORE THE CRISIS**

Prior to the conflict, most of the settlements that later hosted refugees were rural, underdeveloped, and marked by high rates of poverty. Existing infrastructure (such as schools, health centres and roads) was damaged due to seasonal weather patterns, conflict or neglect.

**SITUATION IN 2017**

Between January and October 2017, due to renewed hostilities in South Sudan, nearly 348,000 refugees arrived to Uganda. Most refugee settlements were located next to small villages, quite isolated and far from towns and markets.

**NATIONAL SHELTER STRATEGY**

The Uganda refugee policy discouraged camps and promoted the integration of refugee settlements within the host communities, granting refugees the right to livelihoods, education, freedom of movement, access to documentation and land for agricultural use.

Up to 2016, the shelter response consisted mainly of distribution of emergency shelter items supported by cash-for-work activities. Shelter sizes and designs varied between agencies and projects. Minimal support was provided to households for the construction and maintenance of these shelters. While effective in the short term, this model was not adapted to the protracted nature of the displacement. Emergency shelter solutions did not take into consideration the wide range of family sizes and required regular maintenance due to wear and tear. After six months of use, emergency shelters no longer protected occupants from the elements, requiring additional materials and repairs, which had significant cost implications.

By the end of 2016, the Shelter Working Group developed a new eight-year strategy and asked partners to stop upgrading emergency shelters. Instead, the strategy proposed to build larger semi-permanent shelters with local materials, with a lifespan of three to five years, especially targeting vulnerable households arrived between 2016 and early 2017.

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**SHELTER PROJECTS 2017–2018**

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Local youth were divided into teams, based on an assessment of their basic skills. The teams specialized in different tasks, such as brick production and carpentry. Youth groups were composed of at least 10 people, including minimum two women, a mason and a carpenter and evenly represented both refugee and host community members. The organization ensured there was a mix of skills in the groups, to promote informal learning. Each group was placed under the leadership of a skilled foreman. Young people with no prior basic construction or carpentry skills were mentored by masons and carpenters through on-the-job trainings. The teams were paid through cash for work according to the number of shelters constructed.

The advantage of using cash-for-work groups led by foremen selected by the organization was that local people benefited from employment opportunities more than through the traditional contractor-led approach. Contractors typically bring in people from their own villages, whereas the foremen had to first select people from the area where shelters were being constructed. Other workers could be brought in only if there were not enough skilled labourers in the target village.

**COORDINATION**

The two partner organizations already had a well-established relationship with the district local authorities, line ministries and police in the targeted areas. During implementation, all work plans and updates were shared with district authorities and operational partners. Monthly coordination meetings with all the stakeholders -- co-chaired by the government and sector lead agency -- improved project performance and identified gaps in the implementation of activities between the local government and the implementing partners.

**MAIN CHALLENGES**

**ACCESS CONSTRAINTS.** Poor road networks in the settlements hindered the delivery of materials, equipment and tools, as some plots of land were inaccessible to heavy trucks, resulting in the need to use alternative equipment. For the future, the organization considered coupling shelter interventions with minimal road improvement projects.

**ADMIN AND MANAGEMENT ISSUES.** It was more challenging to manage multiple different contracts with foremen and construction groups for each stage, as opposed to hiring a single large contractor. This also made monitoring of construction quality more complex, so the payments were disbursed only based on shelters built. Additionally, in some cases the agreements with foremen had to be terminated, because they either did not hire local community members or charged a percentage of the workers’ earnings.

**GBV RISK REDUCTION**

The project targeted people who, due to their vulnerability, were at higher risk of exposure to gender-based violence (GBV), which was one of the most prevailing protection issues in the refugee settlements. Linked to gender inequalities rooted in the culture, forms of GBV included child marriage, domestic violence, and emotional and psychological abuse. Long distances to service points, idleness among the youth and community at large, poor vigilance among the community and insufficient lighting in the settlements all contributed to GBV risks.

Before the start of this project, the organization established GBV taskforces throughout the settlement to facilitate the reporting of GBV cases and had dedicated case workers to build trust and help overcome the stigma associated with sexual assault. Community watch groups were also formed in seven villages and gender trainings provided to the welfare committees. Lastly, the organization in collaboration with the sector lead agency started the roll-out of a community mobilization approach, which aimed to stimulate reflection on social norms and challenge power imbalances within refugee communities.

To encourage participation in the project, activities were scheduled at appropriate times, women were actively sought out and minimum quotas of women were respected in the construction groups.

Shelters were built with locally available materials through the engagement of local youth groups who were divided in different teams based on their skills.
DESIGNS AND TECHNICAL SOLUTIONS

Shelter and latrines were built using local typologies and materials, and following national and international standards. One organization built rectangular shelters with corrugated iron roofing, two rooms and lockable doors. The other adopted a traditional typology, which included the use of three layers of grass for the roofing, and 12 support poles to bear the axial load of the roof. The two-room design was preferred, as it allowed greater privacy and flexibility in living arrangements. However, beneficiaries often did not like having two doors in the same room, as this supposedly made it harder to control theft and reduced the wall space to use for storage.

The shelter and latrine designs were adjusted depending on the nature of the soil and the water table. Foundations were either made of burnt bricks or reinforced concrete, and walls were made of unburnt bricks.

In the project areas, latrines were usually raised with untreated poles cast on mud and wattle (highly prone to termite attack). Instead, to reinforce the foundations and plinth, the footing was cast in concrete and walls used cement-sand mortar for the first layers. Latrines used concrete slabs cast in situ and reinforced with iron bars, and ventilation pipes.

MATERIALS AND SUPPLY

Through the cash-for-work scheme, local youth produced unburnt bricks, which were more environmentally friendly than burnt bricks. Timber and other manufactured materials were sourced through suppliers.

As most of the good-quality soils were used for cultivation, service contracts were signed with landowners who, in exchange for a small financial compensation, provided land for a specific period. Contracts specified that landowners were responsible for backfilling any holes before being paid.

However, since the bricks produced were not enough, the organization decided to purchase bricks directly from the local community at a 30 per cent higher rate than in its moulding sites (where contracts had been signed). Brick moulders set up small sites either on their own land or through private agreements with landowners. Most bricks in Rhino were provided in this way rather than through service contracts. However, the latter provided greater control over labour conditions and environmental impact, as well as eased the administrative burden (as less contracts were involved).

During the rainy season, plastic sheets were used to protect walls and bricks. During the dry season, water trucking was introduced to supplement the water fetched by women locally, in order to ensure the work could progress as scheduled.

Hardware materials, such as nails, iron sheets, iron bars and cement, were sourced in bulk from national manufacturers to reduce costs. Bids were advertised on local platforms, in public areas, newspapers and local radios, and were then received and analysed by a procurement committee. The project also supported the economic empowerment of women, who were culturally responsible of cutting the grass and sold it to suppliers of their choice.

On the other hand, the fact that suppliers bought grass and bamboo poles from the community contributed to deforestation. It also had the potential to fuel tensions between hosts and refugees due to the increased pressure on natural resources near settlements and the impact on the availability of grazing area for livestock. To prevent conflicts around land and resource utilization, the refugee welfare committees and the government organized meetings and community dialogues on the subject.

WIDER IMPACTS

As materials were local, transport costs were reduced and cash was injected into the local economy. This provided some economic compensation to the host community.

The participation of refugees helped foster a sense of ownership, and the involvement of youth through cash for work created or strengthened their skills, laying the foundations for future livelihood opportunities. Trained youth could then be employed for maintenance or repair works and future projects, and some stated that they would apply the skills when returning to their home country. Owing to the income they earned, youth opened businesses and were able to achieve better household dietary diversity.

Furthermore, brick moulding significantly increased in the settlement since the start of the project, attracting buyers from afar. This contributed to reducing deforestation, as host communities started using more bricks rather than timber.

### MATERIALS AND LABOUR FOR A SHELTER IN RHINO

<table>
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<tr>
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<th>Units</th>
<th>Qty</th>
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<td>Water supply</td>
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STRENGTHS, WEAKNESSES AND LESSONS LEARNED

**STRENGTHS**

+ **Effective coordination between all actors** which improved efficiency, saved resources and time. Notably, this led to greater inclusion of the most vulnerable people, thanks to referral mechanisms and the use of common tools and vulnerability criteria.

+ **Local materials** were chosen to ensure their availability and make repair and maintenance more affordable. Environmental impact and costs were also contained, thanks to the reduced need for processing and transport. **The shelters were designed respecting the local building cultures** and incorporating communities’ feedback, which contributed to promoting their cultural heritage.

+ **The project built on existing community strengths and resources** via the involvement of youth from both refugee and host populations.

+ **The project provided income opportunities** to local youth, injected cash in the local markets and contributed to the revitalization of brick making in the target areas.

+ **Community members provided labour** to build shelters for those households who did not have the capacity to do so themselves.

+ **The inclusion of host community members as beneficiaries** of the cash-for-work component strengthened peaceful coexistence with the refugees and more access to land, which in turn also increased livelihood opportunities.

**WEAKNESSES**

- **The procurement and logistical procedures took longer than expected**, leading to the extension of the project. This was due to a combination of factors, such as having to deal with multiple foremen rather than with a single large contractor.

- **The funds budgeted for shelters and latrines were insufficient**. As a result, the project was only able to support a limited number of people compared to the needs.

- **Staff turnover** led to a constant and costly cycle of recruitment and ongoing training of staff.

- **Access and weather constraints were not well anticipated** (e.g. the onset of the rainy season), leading to challenges related to staff mobility, brick production and the timely completion of construction works. Better plans should have been made before the wet season and should have been flexible enough to adapt to different circumstances.

- **Some beneficiaries struggled with the rendering process** given that the houses were often much taller than the traditional typology. The render itself at times was badly mixed, as the earth varied in quality, mainly leaving the mud bricks exposed to weathering. A small number of people did not see the benefit of rendering and expressed that agencies should be responsible, which showed the ongoing need for community engagement.

- **The initial work plan was not realistic**. It did not adequately factor-in the six months needed for preparatory work and community engagement.

**LESSONS LEARNED**

- **Joint monitoring** with shelter working group partners can help to address issues of quality and value for money, and can support with identifying solutions to various challenges.

- **Although only based on anecdotal evidence, involving the refugee welfare committees** in project activities – especially in the establishment of the youth groups – **enabled the voices of the wider community to be integrated in the project**. Their involvement was also a way to further legitimize and recognize their role and work in the communities.

- **The community mobilization approach can be greatly strengthened**. It is essential to have continuous inputs from protection and community mobilization teams, both in order to support appropriately the workers’ groups and ensure that the training element is well implemented, but also to ensure that the most vulnerable fully benefit from the interventions.