**CASE STUDY**

**NIGERIA 2017–2018 / CONFLICT**

**KEYWORDS:** Shelter repairs, Cash, Links with recovery, Security of tenure / HLP

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>CRISIS</th>
<th>Conflict (Boko Haram conflict), 2014–onwards</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>TOTAL PEOPLE AFFECTED*</td>
<td>7.7 million affected; 1.6 million displaced; 1.3 million returnees; 2.1 million with shelter needs</td>
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<tr>
<td>PROJECT LOCATIONS</td>
<td>Hong and Gombi LGA in Adamawa State, Gwoza and Ngala LGA in Borno State</td>
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<td>PROJECT BENEFICIARIES</td>
<td>900 households (5,683 individuals)</td>
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<td>PROJECT OUTPUTS</td>
<td>900 damaged houses repaired 710 households receiving livelihoods assistance</td>
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<td>OUTCOME INDICATOR</td>
<td>100% beneficiary satisfaction</td>
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<tr>
<td>SHELTER SIZE</td>
<td>24.5m² (two rooms of approx. 3.5x3.5m)</td>
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<tr>
<td>SHELTER DENSITY</td>
<td>3.8m² per person</td>
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<tr>
<td>MATERIALS COST</td>
<td>USD 538 (incl. cash grant)</td>
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<td>PROJECT COST</td>
<td>USD 660 per household</td>
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**PROJECT SUMMARY**

Through a settlement-based approach, the project provided shelter repair support to affected households, as well as rehabilitation of community infrastructure, vocational training and livelihood assistance. The shelter component targeted 900 households with damaged houses in return areas, using a combination of in-kind distribution and cash grants. An individual scope of work was developed for each damaged house and technical supervision was provided during the rehabilitation, undertaken by the families themselves. The cash distribution was challenging due to high security risks and limited financial service providers.

**TIMELINE**

1. **01 Jun–31 Jul 2017:** Development of context-specific assessment tool and adaptation of the tool suggested by the Sector.
2. **01 Aug–30 Sep 2017:** Shelter needs assessments in return areas.
3. **01–30 Oct 2017:** Cash feasibility assessments, focus group discussions, market assessments.

**STRENGTHS**
- One-hundred per cent beneficiary satisfaction.
- The most vulnerable groups were reached.
- Families were able to rehabilitate their entire houses.
- The shelter component was linked to livelihoods interventions.
- The project enabled family reunification.

**WEAKNESSES**
- The cash was distributed late, leading to some people needing to take out loans.
- Distributing the cash in one instalment affected the conditionality of the grant.
- Differing levels of damage required a more flexible package.
- Preparatory stages took a long time.
- Livelihood activities were temporarily disturbed for some families.
- There were not enough materials to build or repair WASH facilities.
CONFLICT IN THE NORTH EAST

Since the onset of the conflict in north-east Nigeria in 2013, the region experienced a massive destruction of infrastructure, collapse of livelihoods, widespread displacement and brutal attacks on civilians. Threats of attacks by armed groups and military restrictions negatively impacted trade, livelihoods and markets, leaving many civilians dependent on humanitarian assistance. Since late 2016, humanitarian partners scaled up their activities. While major displacements continued to take place, some families started to return. As of December 2017, there were 1.3 million returnees and, in 2018, humanitarian actors increased their assistance in support of voluntary return.

SITUATION BEFORE THE CRISIS

Even prior to the crisis, northern Nigeria had very low development indicators. Compared to the wealthier southern states that benefit from oil production, the north is heavily dependent on agriculture and large parts of the population live in rural or peri-urban settings. Rural settings were dominated by self-settled villages with houses constructed with mud or mud bricks with thatched roofs. Peri-urban areas had more organized layouts, with houses mostly built with concrete blocks and corrugated galvanized iron roofing sheets.

SITUATION DURING THE CRISIS

Shelter needs were defined by the various waves of displacement, new arrivals and returns. Displaced populations residing in camps or camp-like settings and new arrivals from inaccessible areas lived in emergency or makeshift shelters, while returnees required transitional solutions. Nearly one quarter of assessed returnees in return areas lived in inadequate shelters, including partially damaged houses. The majority of returnee families experienced medium to heavy damage to their houses, with burnt roofs making most of them inhabitable. Many did not possess the necessary resources to rehabilitate their houses, as the crisis had impacted their income significantly.

NATIONAL SHELTER STRATEGY

The national shelter strategy in 2018 aimed to: 1) ensure sufficient, coordinated and adequate delivery of emergency shelter solutions to respond to immediate needs; 2) deliver reinforced/transitional shelters and repair assistance; and 3) deliver flexible, coordinated, adequate and harmonized NFI kits.

Aligned with this strategy, the organization implemented different types of shelter interventions in the country, including construction of emergency and transitional shelters, distribution of emergency shelter kits, construction of transit shades and reception centres and reinforcement of emergency shelters in displacement sites.

WIDER PROGRAMME GOALS

To support returnees in re-establishing themselves in their areas of origin, the organization implemented a wider programme, which included livelihood activities and quick-impact community projects. This case study focuses on the shelter repair component, which distributed shelter repair kits and cash top-up grants, as recommended by the Sector.

TARGETING

The organization conducted detailed shelter needs assessments in the most affected areas with the highest number of returnees. The Local Government Areas (LGAs) were selected based on the severity of destruction, the socioeconomic impact of the crisis on livelihoods and the availability of other humanitarian actors.

In the target areas, a stakeholder mapping was first conducted. Group discussions and key informant interviews were then held with the community members, local leaders, vendors and Financial Service Providers (FSPs). Secondary data analysis was conducted through the 4W matrix of the Sector, to identify the partners present in the locations, the types of assistance provided and the existing gaps.

1 For another example of a shelter project implemented by the organization in the country, see case study A.18 in Shelter Projects 2015-2016.
2 The kits contents are available at https://bit.ly/2TnnbVw
3 The population data was taken from the Displacement Tracking Matrix (DTM), http://www.globaldtm.info/nigeria/
The selection of beneficiaries in the LGAs was conducted in accordance to the level of damage to the houses (with categories 1–4, from light to heavy damage). Female-headed households, the elderly, persons with disabilities and mental illness were prioritized. The criteria for selection were communicated to the community.

**PROJECT IMPLEMENTATION**

The project was directly implemented by a team of 30 staff, with eight technical supervisors in the field and 22 enumerators, overseen from Maiduguri and Yola. The following main steps were taken.

**PROCUREMENT.** Materials were procured locally through competitive bidding and were delivered to the organization’s warehouse without delays.

**CASH FEASIBILITY ASSESSMENT.** Since the damage level and materials used for each house differed, a cash grant was included in the kit, to give the households the flexibility of buying additional materials to complement the standard package, as well as to engage skilled labour for the rehabilitation works. A comprehensive assessment was carried out by shelter teams with the technical support from a cash advisor. Standard Operating Procedures for cash-based interventions were developed specific to the context. Due to the lack of mobile network infrastructure in the target areas, mobile money transfers were not an option. Cash-in-envelope was also discarded because of the security risks. Therefore, the transfer had to be done through an FSP.

**SELECTION OF FSP.** Initially, there was lack of interest from FSPs in operating in high-risk areas, and this led the organization to request for bids several times. Meetings were held with FSPs to explain the nature of the project, as most of them had not been involved in humanitarian cash transfers before. Since beneficiaries did not have bank accounts and there were no functioning banks or postal services in the target locations, the organization prioritized FSPs who had local agents in those areas. After a lengthy analysis and consultations with various FSPs, a prominent bank with registered agents in Borno and Adamawa State was selected.

**SCOPE OF WORK.** Technical supervisors were deployed to prepare a scope of work for each household, based on the assessed level of damage and the materials and the cash available.

**DISTRIBUTION OF MATERIALS.** Distributions were carried out by a team of 11 staff, including one staff to assist with biometric verification of beneficiaries; three shelter staff to verify the kits provided and offer technical advice and sensitization on the usage of the kits; five site management staff facilitating the distribution, including crowd control and setting up of a complaints desk; two psychosocial support staff to identify vulnerable beneficiaries and ensure their safe and equitable access to assistance. Push-carts were also arranged to assist vulnerable families to carry the materials home.

**CASH DISTRIBUTION.** Due to the lengthy FSP selection process, the cash distribution did not take place along with the material distribution and could not be disbursed in two instalments, as originally planned. The cash was distributed in one instalment, during the last month of the project, by bank agents overseen by project staff.

The project included a cash grant which, due to delays, was only distributed towards the end of the implementation. Nonetheless, people were found to have spent their own savings on the repair works.

Damage was categorized in four groups. 1) Bullet holes on the external walls but not penetrated inside; hairline cracks in very few walls; fall of small pieces of plaster only. 2) Doors and/or windows need to be replaced, damage to brickwork 10%. 3) Failure of structural elements, damage to walls 25%. 4) Completely damaged with bullet holes, serious failure of walls; partial structure failure of roof and floor.

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MONITORING AND EVALUATION. Regular monitoring visits were conducted by technical supervisors after the material distribution and continued until completion certificates were signed by both parties. Post-distribution monitoring was conducted to assess the usage of the materials and cash. Results showed that although the cash component came late in the project, beneficiaries still used their resources towards the intended project goals.

COMMUNITY ENGAGEMENT
Ahead of distributions, community mobilization activities were conducted providing information on dates and place of distribution, as well as entitlements of each household. Community consultations were also a key component of the cash feasibility assessments. This was done to explain project activities and to minimize the risk of any potential tensions among community members. Community leaders assisted during the distribution process to ensure it took place smoothly, as well as to fast track the process for any vulnerable household.

The families actively contributed to the rehabilitation works both in terms of labour (29%) and additional materials (21%). Carpenters and masons from the community assisted extremely vulnerable families in the construction works for free.

HOUSING, LAND AND PROPERTY
HLP issues were considered during the assessments and beneficiary identification, for instance the possibility of another group claiming the land or properties. In the selected LGAs, the majority of the houses were inhabited by the owners, and the community had strong intra-communal consensus on land tenure. If no ownership document was available, a written form of approval from the community leader and representatives was provided as proof of ownership, as a formal documentation process was not possible for most families.

The organization also consulted the LGA chairmen, who could ascertain whether a group of people was originally from their area. Despite tenure being disconnected from any formal system, the level of tenure security was considered “high enough” to allow for shelter rehabilitation to proceed.

In a different LGA that was not targeted, there was no consensus between the community as to the real owners of the houses and land. For this reason – and due to the limited time frame – it was impossible to proceed with implementation.

LINKS WITH RECOVERY
To support communities to recover more holistically, the shelter project was linked with several quick-impact livelihood activities in the same locations. These included the provision of short-term cash-for-work opportunities to rehabilitate community infrastructures (school, markets, roads, etc.). Vocational training was provided to the same communities on the trades that were most in demand, namely cap knitting, drink production and baking, and these were supplemented by a start-up business grant. The project also provided capacity-building and para-veterinary kits to a local group and distributed animal food to livestock owners in the same communities. A total of 710 households benefited from these activities.

HANDOVER PHASE
No formal handover was required. Each household had their own scope of work based on the type of damages, so they were aware of all the steps of the rehabilitation from the outset, as well as the expected achievements. The roving technical supervisors knew when the family completed the required rehabilitation works. Following this, a certificate of completion was duly signed by a technical supervisor and the head of household.

WIDER IMPACTS OF THE PROJECT
The needs assessment and post-distribution monitoring reports were widely shared with all partners engaged in shelter activities in the north-east, to disseminate the findings and lessons learned.

Efforts were also made at the Sector level to incorporate some of the recommendations from the post-distribution monitoring of this project, in order to slightly modify kit contents. After the project, the organization expanded both the materials and cash amount in the kit. It also started to look into expanding its cash-based interventions for shelter.

Finally, due to the success of this project, the Nigerian Humanitarian Fund – which usually supports emergency shelter kits and construction of emergency shelters – started funding similar projects in other locations. As the project included early recovery initiatives, other donors also showed interest.
STRENGTHS, WEAKNESSES AND LESSONS LEARNED

STRENGTHS

All of the surveyed beneficiaries reported being satisfied with the assistance, as it had significantly improved the living conditions of their families. This was possible also thanks to their engagement throughout the process.

The most vulnerable groups were reached and the selection process was deemed fair and transparent by the beneficiaries.

Families were able rehabilitate their entire houses and some could even expand the original size of the house.

The project was linked to livelihoods interventions as part of a holistic approach to support communities’ recovery and social cohesion.

Some families were able to reunite as a result of repairs to their homes.

WEAKNESSES

The cash disbursement took place several weeks after the material distribution. This led to some of the beneficiaries needing to take out a loan to rehabilitate their shelters, although they were able to pay them off when the cash was received.

Distributing the cash in one instalment affected the conditionality of the grant. However, post-distribution monitoring showed that most families used their own resources towards the project goal.

A more tailored package of repair kits and cash grants would have been useful to adapt to the level of damage and the type of materials (e.g. masonry vs mud houses).

Preparatory stages for this project took a long time, as this was the first project of its kind for the organization in Nigeria, which impacted the actual implementation period.

The project temporarily disturbed livelihood activities of some families, as the head of household had to carry out or supervise the rehabilitation works.

There were not enough materials to build or repair water and sanitation facilities.

LESSONS LEARNED

Following this project, the kit contents and cash amount were adjusted based on lessons learned and beneficiaries’ feedback. Additional tools and one extra bundle of CGI for roofing were included. The cash grant was also increased by about 30 per cent (USD 28), to allow people to cover larger portions of their houses, and repair or rebuild water and sanitation facilities, as well.

Brick-making moulds should be considered, as buildings in most of the targeted locations are made of mud bricks. In addition, training on mud brick production and providing start-up business capital to small traders of construction materials would ensure a better connection between the supply and demand of shelter materials in the local market.

Longer-term contracts should be given to financial service providers, as the selection process took very long. The organization made efforts to allow for more flexible agreements to avoid future delays in cash disbursements.